How Downwards Causation Occurs in Digital Computers by Ellis, George
HOW DOWNWARDS CAUSATION OCCURS IN DIGITAL
COMPUTERS
A PREPRINT
George Ellis
Department of Mathematics
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch, Cape Town 7701
george.ellis@uct.ac.za
Barbara Drossel
Institute of Condensed Matter Physics
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Hochschulstr. 6, 64289 Darmstadt
drossel@fkp.tu-darmstadt.de
August 17, 2019
ABSTRACT
Digital computers carry out algorithms coded in high level programs. These abstract entities determine
what happens at the physical level: they control whether electrons flow through specific transistors at
specific times or not, entailing downward causation in both the logical and implementation hierarchies.
This paper explores how this is possible in the light of the alleged causal completeness of physics at
the bottom level, and highlights the mechanism that enables strong emergence (the manifest causal
effectiveness of application programs) to occur. Although synchronic emergence of higher levels
from lower levels is manifestly true, diachronic emergence is generically not the case; indeed we give
specific examples where it cannot occur because of the causal effectiveness of higher level variables.
Keywords Downward causation, Digital computers, Logical control, Transistor Physics
1 Introduction
The issue of whether strong emergence is possible is a highly contested topic, see for example
[Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008)], [Humphreys (2016)], and [Gibb et al (2019)] for discussion. This is closely
linked to the issue of downwards causation ([Ellis et al (2012)]), because if higher emergent levels have real causal pow-
ers in their own right, as claimed by [Noble (2011)] in the case of biology, they must have the ability to act down to lower
levels in order to shape lower level dynamics so as to meet higher level needs. The purpose of the present paper is to show
how this occurs in digital computers, where algorithms embodied in computer programs, together with data, are causally
effective by shaping outcomes at the electron level. This is what enables the causal power of computer programs in the
physical world world, as for instance in car manufacture, landing an aircraft, playing music, playing chess, or searching
the web ([McCormack (2011)]). Thus strong emergence certainly takes place in those cases: these outcomes cannot be
derived in a solely bottom-up way, because they enable conditional branching logic to have causal power, for exam-
ple (“IF {aircraft too high} THEN {reduce engine power}”), and so on, where “too high” is a highly contextual variable.
Here ‘causation’ is understood in a counter-factual way [Menzies, (2017)]: if the application program were different,
which would be the case if a different algorithm were employed (for example computing airflow over wings, rather than
the next move in a chess game), there would be different flows of electrons through gates at the transistor level. Thus
both the dynamics of the gates (the time-dependent way they implement Boolean logic) and of the electrons (which
carriers flow through which semi-conductor materials at what time) is controlled jointly by the application programs
implemented in the computer, the data loaded, and the time the program is turned on. These are in turn determined by
the computer operator in the social setting which is the context in which this all happens, which social context also led
to the existence of the computer in the first place. Physics is not causally complete by itself; it is only causally complete
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in this full context (§7).
It has been claimed in Chapter 2 of [Ellis (2016)] that downwards causation takes place in digital computers, and this is
implicit in Simon’s discussion of technological systems ([Simon H A (1996)]), Tannebaum’s description of hierarchical
computer organisation ([Tanenbaum (2006)]), and Mellisinos’ presentation of how the logical and physical levels in
digital computers interrelate ([Mellisinos (1990)]). However none of these writings comment on how the branching
logic of algorithms can be realised on the basis of the alleged underlying Hamiltonian physics, whose unitary nature is
the essential basis for claims that supervenience - the statement that a specific lower level state uniquely determines a
specific higher level state, and any difference in higher level state must be reflected in a difference in lower level states -
undermines the possibility of strong emergence.
In this paper, §2.1 sets the stage by discussing the relevant hierarchical structures. (§3-§5) identifies the mechanism
whereby logical variables reach down to cause branching of the physical dynamics at the electron level, and allows
abstract structures to have causal powers (§7.1). While synchronic supervenience (that is, supervenience occuring
at one time) can be claimed to always occur in digital computers, in many cases diachronic supervenience (that is,
supervenience occurring at an earlier time in relation to outcomes at a later time) cannot occur, as discussed in §6.
This is analogous to the way such downward causation happens in biology, as discussed in [Ellis and Koppel (2019)].
However the mechanism whereby the underlying microscopic processes at the electron level get conscripted to fulfill
higher level purposes is completely different in the two cases (§7.2).
2 Modular hierarchical structures
Like all truly complex systems, digital computers are Modular Hierarchical Structures in both physical and logical
terms. Because they are structured, higher levels can constrain and control lower level dynamics ([Blachowicz (2013)]).
In order to achieve complex emergent outcomes, that structure must be both hierarchical (§2.1) and modular (§2.2). A
key feature of such structures is multiple realisability of higher level structure and functions at lower levels (§2.3).
2.1 The orthogonal hierarchies
In digital computers, there is a logical hierarchy and an implementation hierarchy ([Ellis (2016)]:§2). The latter
implements the former. Upwards emergence of higher levels and downwards constraints on lower levels takes place in
both cases.
The logical hierarchy (software) This tower of ‘virtual machines’ MI , each with associated language LI , is
discussed in depth in ([Tanenbaum (2006)]:pp.2-8), and is represented in Table 1.
Level Logic Downward Process Agent
M6 L6: Application program ⇓ Logic and data Program code
M5 L5: High level language ⇓ Translation: Compiler Syntax, Semantics
M4 L4: Assembly language ⇓ Translation: Assembler Syntax, Semantics
M3 L3: Operating system level ⇓ Partial Interpretation Operating system
M2 L2: Machine language ⇓ Interpretation ISA
M1 L1: Microprograms ⇓ Directly executed Instructions
M0 Digital logic level (Binary) Hardware Gates
Table 1: Multilevel machine with a tower of virtual machines MI each with a language LI . The lowest logical level is
M1 with machine language L1, with binary instructions directly executed by electronic circuits. ISA is the Instruction
Set Architecture. Adapted from [Tanenbaum (2006)], Figs. 1-1, 1-2.
Each language is characterised by its Syntax and its Semantics. The user interacts with the application program level
M6, which might be a word processor, internet browser, image processor, etc; or with the high level language level M5:
languages such as FORTRAN, C, JAVA, PYTHON, etc. Compilers or assemblers chain the high level logic down to the
microprogramming level; the resulting binary code can be directly executed by the hardware ([Tanenbaum (2006)]).
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The implementation hierarchy (hardware) This hierarchy, see Table 2, is implied by [Mellisinos (1990)] and
[Tanenbaum (2006)]. It is what enables the logical hierarchy to influence physical reality. However there is not a 1-1
correspondence between the levels in the two hierarchies.
Entity Nature
Level 7 Internet Maximal Network
Level 6 Network Linked computers, printers, file servers
Level 5 Computer Components linked by bus, clock
Level 4 Components ALU, CPU, Memory, I/O devices
Level 3 Gates Boolean logic: AND, OR, NOT
Level 2 Transistors Binary ON/OFF function
Level 1 Crystalline structure Band Structure
Level 0 Carriers Current Flow
Table 2: Implementation hierarchy (schematic). This is the physical context within which upward emergence and
downward causation takes place. Table 3 amplifies the lower levels.
The interface between the computer’s software and hardware at level 4 is the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), which
is the external (abstract) view of the computer chip (hardware).
2.2 Modularity
As discussed clearly by ([Booch (2006)]:3-26), developing from [Simon H A (1996)], in order to obtain complex
behaviour, each level LN should be made of networks of modules at level LN−1. The key point is that we split a
complex task up into simpler tasks, design units to handle the simpler tasks, and then knit them together in networks so
that overall when taken together they handle the complex task. To do so, modules are characterised by (a) Information
Hiding, (b) Abstraction, (c) Interface Specification, and (d) being Modifiable. The situation is similar for physical
modules and for logical modules, and the whole is done in a hierarchical way (sub-modules of modules do even simpler
tasks).
Figure 1: Simplified block diagram of Intel 8088. 1=main registers; 2=segment registers and IP; 3=address adder; 4=in-
ternal address bus; 5=instruction queue; 6=control unit; 7=bus interface; 8=internal databus; 9=ALU; 10/11/12=ex-
ternal address/data/control bus. (Wikipedia, Intel 8086: open source)
Interface Specification The interface between each module and the rest of the system must be carefully specified, as
in the case of the ISA: what control variables, parameters, and data will be sent to the module, and what will be sent out
to other modules in the system from the module.
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Information Hiding The module’s internal variables are hidden from outside view, all that is required is that the
module does what it is required to do, as viewed from outside. The user does not mind what internal variables are
chosen and what logic is used.
Abstraction An abstraction is an external description of what the module does in a reliable way. This should include
a name by which one can refer to the module, which indicates what it does (it should have a unique identifier). This can
be seen in the case of the modules identified in Figure 1 (a representation of a specific case of Level 6 in Table 2).
Modifiable The previous points are directly related to multiple realisability (§.2.3) We can change the internal
variables and even the internal logic of the module, as long as the externally viewed functionality, as defined by the
interface and abstraction, is maintained. The system as a whole only cares that the module does what it is designed to do,
not how it does it (although some implementations are preferred over others if they are either faster, or use less resources).
Figure 1 shows a typical set of physical modules that make up level 5 in the Implementation Hierarchy (Table 2).
2.3 Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability is a key indicator that downward causation is taking place [Auletta, Ellis & Jaeger (2008)],
[Ellis (2016)], because it indicates that higher level needs are driving lower level structure and outcomes. It does not
matter which lower level entities are chosen to carry out higher level needs as long as they do the job; the effective causal
entity at the lower level is the equivalence class at that level that does what is needed ([Anthony (2008)], [Ellis (2016)],
[Bickle (2019)]). This is a central feature of digital computers: both hardware and software can be realised in multiple
ways. A modular structure plays a key role in facilitating this (you can alter the module logic and internal variables as
long as the interface to the outside world is unchanged).
Module Significance: Looked at this way, the central reason why modules are important is precisely
that they allow multiple realisability to happen.
Hardware There are many different microprocessors with different instruction sets that can be used in a digital
computer while allowing running of the same high-level software [Tanenbaum (2006)]. A classic example is a Java
Virtual Machine [Lindholm et al (2014], allowing standard Java to be run on any hardware. Wikipedia (“Java Virtual
Machine”) describes it thus:
“A Java virtual machine (JVM) is a virtual machine that enables a computer to run Java programs as
well as programs written in other languages that are also compiled to Java bytecode. The JVM is
detailed by a specification that formally describes what is required in a JVM implementation. Having
a specification ensures interoperability of Java programs across different implementations so that
program authors using the Java Development Kit (JDK) need not worry about idiosyncrasies of the
underlying hardware platform.”
One can perhaps regard this as the central theme of Alan Turing’s great work: a Universal Turing Machine can be
implemented in any hardware, provided it does indeed implement the required logic [Hodges (1992)].
Software Any algorithm can be run by any properly defined computer language - of which there are a great many. A
particular algorithm (e.g. Bubblesort, see §3.2 below) can be loaded in any desired high level language (FORTRAN,
BASIC, COBOL, LISP, PYTHON, C, etc.) and then via compilers and interpreters [Aho et al (2006)] the same logic
will be realised in the Virtual Machine hierarchy (Table 1) in a different language at each level. A key point here is that
algorithms go hand in hand with data structures [Lafore (2002)]; both the software and the data have to be represented
correctly at each level.
The relation between hardware and software A further key point is that the boundary between what is done in
hardware and what is done by software is fluid. Tannenbaum ([Tanenbaum (2006)]:8) states “A central theme of
this book is that hardware and software are logically equivalent”. It is a matter of convenience - and performance
speeds - how the split is made. Thus for example memory can be virtual ([Tanenbaum (2006)]:429-453) or physical
([Tanenbaum (2006)]:159-173).
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2.4 Black boxing not coarse graining
As pointed out long ago by Ross Ashby [Ross Ashby (1992)], when one is dealing with modules that perform logical
operations, the appropriate method of going from a lower to a higher level is not coarse graining, it is black boxing. One
assembles lower level units that perform specific logical operations Oi in networks into an entity that then comprise a
next-higher level module performing operations OI . Examples are how transistors can be connected to give modules
that perform arithmetic and logic operations, including being decoders, multiplexers, flip-flops (the basis of memory),
registers, and counters ([Mellisinos (1990)]:44-58; [Tanenbaum (2006)]:136-164). A key feature here is multiple
realizability, as discussed above: different circuits can give equivalent logical results, as e.g. in the case of the half-adder
([Mellisinos (1990)]:45). Boolean algebra can be used to determine equivalent circuits ([Tanenbaum (2006)]:141-145).
3 Branching logic at all Levels
Causation is a contested word. However in the case of digital computers, it is quite clear it is taking place when
the computer is used. A program is loaded, and the operator runs the program. What happens at the physical level
is determined by what program is loaded. Thus as mentioned above, we rely on a counterfactual view of causation
[Menzies, (2017)]: if a different program is loaded, different flows of electrons will take place at the bottom level.1
This takes place by a flow of causation from the logical level to the physical level, whereby logical branching (§3.1),
exemplified by Bubble Sort (§3.2), leads to physical branching (§3.3), (§3.4).
3.1 Logical Branching
At user program level, one has logical branching of the form IF .. THEN .... ELSE, or WHILE ... DO ...., or REPEAT
UNTIL ..... This logic is chained down by compilers or interpreters to lower abstract machine levels, as discussed above
(see Table 1). Given this logic, branching is governed by the relevant data.
At each level MI there is a language LI with a syntax that allows such branching; the details of the syntax varies at
each level, and with the specific software implementation.
3.2 Example: Bubblesort
To give a specific example of logic implemented in a computer, Bubblesort is one of the simplest sorting procedures
([Lafore (2002)]:79-89). In pseudocode, it can be written (Wikipedia) as follows
1 procedure bubbleSort ( A : list of sortable items )
2 n = length(A)
3 repeat
4 newn = 0
5 for i = 1 to n-1 inclusive do
6 if A[i-1] > A[i] then
7 swap(A[i-1], A[i])
8 newn = i
9 end if
10 end for
11 n = newn
12 until n ≤ 1
13 end procedure
Note the branching operations at lines 6 and 12 (there is always an implicit assumption “IF NOT, just carry on”). How
this is implemented in C++ is shown in https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/cpp-program-for-bubble-sort/ which also gives
links to implementation in Java and Python. For an assembly language version, see https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/8085-
program-bubble-sort. This variety of implementations of the same logic is of course a demonstration of multiple
realisability.
1There are of course lower levels than the electron level, as described by the standard model of particle physics, which may in
turn depend on even lower levels such as string theory/M theory.They are of no concern to us here.
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Furthermore there are a variety of other sorting algorithms, e.g. Mergesort, Quicksort, Heapsort, etc ([Lafore (2002)]:89-
108,279-294,315-364). They have been extensively compared for efficiency (Wikipedia: Sorting Algorithm). The point
here is again that of multiple realisability and modularity: many programs need a sorting subroutine, so the logical
need is simply an algorithm which will sort a list; the operational need is a module that will be efficient in terms of the
type of list that will need to be sorted. It is that functional requirement that drives the designer’s choice of a specific
sorting algorithm in a particular program. Thus higher level need acts down to select lower level options from amongst
a variety of choices (a classic example of adaptive selection).
3.3 Physical Branching
Corresponding to the logical branching, physical branching takes place at each level in Table 2:
At transistor level, the branching is ON or OFF, depending on the gate voltage V (t) (see ( 1)).
At gate level, the branching is in terms of truth values of basic logical operations: AND, NOT, NOR which can then
lead to branching in comparators, adders, decoders, etc. ([Mellisinos (1990)]:37-58, [Tanenbaum (2006)]:135-164),
with outcomes depending on the data.
At computer level: branching occurs via CPU control of the basic instruction FETCH-EXECUTE cycle
([Mellisinos (1990)]:75, [Tanenbaum (2006)]:173-202), with activation of different instruction memory and data mem-
ory locations and output modules via a bus [Tanenbaum (2006)]:176-220) controlled by a clock. Branching occurs
according to the relevant data.
At network level: branching is for instance via requests represented by a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), sent
between computers identified by their Internet Protocol address (IP address), as for example sending a request to Google
for information.
3.4 Relation
Logical branching governs physical branching, which is demonstrable by changing the program loaded. Outcomes
alter, although the physical structure involved (the computer hardware) is identical. This happens via compilers
[Aho et al (2006)] and interpreters ([Tanenbaum (2006)]) that chain logic down to the machine code level. The logic of
the algorithm [Knuth (1973)], for example Bubblesort (§3.2), is preserved during the downward chaining process, as it
gets rewritten in different languages LI with different variables and syntax (Table 1). The abstract becomes physical at
the machine level, where digital logic is expressed in a timed sequence of electron flows that turn transistors ON or OFF
([Tanenbaum (2006)]:2-7, 231-326; [Mellisinos (1990)]:75-80).
4 Contextual branching at the transistor level
Time dependent control signals at the machine level alter gate voltages V (t) of integrated circuit transistors (see Figs. 2
and 3). This changes a transistor from OFF to ON or vice versa, depending on a threshold level In the MOSFET case
shown in Figs. 2 and 3, the logic is,
{IF V (t) > Vthreshold THEN current flows ELSE not} (1)
The question is how this branching logic relates to a unitary description at the microscopic level, which does not per
se allow branching (cf. [Ellis and Koppel (2019)]). We discuss in turn, the interacting levels (§4.1); the disconnect
between descriptions at different levels (§4.2); and the downward links for branching causation (§4.3).
4.1 The interacting levels
To understand how the physical makeup of transistors can enable logical branching, one needs to look in more detail at
the physical hierarchical structuring at the transistor level (Table 3, in effect an expansion of the lower levels of Table 2).
Level Structure Outcomes
T5 gates transistor combinations Boolean Logic
T4 transistors base, emitter, collector; carrier channels ON/OFF
T3 crystal structure ions; symmetry, broken by impurities phonons, band structure
T2 Electron population densities, average flows, resistance electron diffusion, current
T1 Individual ions, electrons ion bonding; electron velocities, collisions electron drift
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Table 3: The physical (implementation hierarchy) at the transistor level.
Level T5: Gates Transistors linked via wires and resistors form the basic logical gates. Some of them can be made of
a single integrated set of transistors.
Level T4: Transistors Transistors are based in semiconductors such as silicon that have been doped with donor (type
n) or acceptor (type p) impurities. Considering Field Effect Transistors there is an (n,p,n) structure. Fig.2 shows it when
Figure 2: MOSFET with no bias applied to
gate. The depletion layers separates the n-
doped and p-doped regions, so no current flows.
Source: [Simon (2013)]:204. With Permission
from OUP and the author
Figure 3: MOSFET with bias applied to gate.
The depletion layer shifts, so a continuous chan-
nel forms between the source and drain and cur-
rent flows. Source: [Simon (2013)]:205. With
Permssion from OUP and the author
not conducting and Fig.3 when it is conducting. The gate is separated from the p-and n-doped semiconductor regions
by an oxide insulator, making a capacitor. An applied voltage on the gate attracts electrons from the source and thereby
opens a conducting channel between the source and drain, through alterations to the chemical potential and depletion
region.
Level T3: Crystal structure, phonons, electronic bands The crystal structure with its particular symmetries and
degrees of freedom gives rise to the various types of phonons and to the electronic band structure. Depending on the
distance between the bands and their filling, one obtains the distinction between conductors, insulators, and semi-
conductors ([Mellisinos (1990)]). In a semiconductor, conduction occurs only at nonzero temperature as electrons need
to become excited from the valence band to the conduction band.
Level T2: Electron population Electron/carrier flow is due to (1) Diffusion (due to a density gradient), leading to
depletion regions; (2) Drift due to an electric potential, leading to a current. Resistance, characterised by a collision
time, occurs due to collisions with impurities, phonons, and other electrons. Electron conduction is time asymmetric
because of interaction with a heat bath. Due to its dissipative nature, electron conduction is not a Hamiltonian process.
Level T1: Ions and electrons The description on the most microscopic level is based on a Hamiltonian for the ions
and electrons ([Phillips (2012)]:16):
H = −
∑
i
~2
2Mi
∇2Ri −
∑
i
~2
2me
∇2ri +
∑
i
∑
j>i
ZiZje
2
4pi0 |Ri −Rj |
−
∑
i
∑
j
Zie
2
4pi0 |Ri − rj | +
∑
i
∑
j>i
e2
4pi0 |ri − rj | (2)
However, in order to derive from this Hamiltonian the actual lattice structure and electron charge distribution in the
transistor, a series of approximations is required:
A: First, the electrons are separated into conduction band electrons (essentially unbound and so free to move) and
valence band electrons (closely bound to ions and so localised). This transforms the Hamiltonian (2) to the form,
H = Ti + Te + Vii + Vee + Vei + Ecore (3)
B: Next, the Born-Oppenheimer (adiabatic) approximation is used, which assumes that the electrons are at all times in
equilibrium with the positions of the ions, see for instance [Schwabl (2007)], Ch. 15. To this purpose, the wave function
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is factorized into an electron part Ψe(r,R) for given positions of the ions, and an ion part Φ(R),
Ψ(r,R) = Φ(R)Ψe(r,R) , (4)
leading to the electron equation
(Te + Vee + Vei)Ψe(r,R) = Ee(R)Ψe(r,R) (5)
and the ion equation
(Ti + Vii + Ecore + Ee(R))Φ(R) = EΦ(R) . (6)
C: The electron equation (5) is used to obtain the electronic band structure. Since the band structure is based on a
picture of non-interacting electrons, the interaction term Vee must be dropped so that the electron Hamiltonian becomes
a sum of one-particle Hamiltonians. Given a periodic lattice, the solutions are Bloch waves, giving the energy bands
En(k), which are the lattice analog of free particle motion ([Phillips (2012)]:22).
D: Electron-lattice interactions occur via phonons ([Simon (2013)]:82-84, 90-95). The ion equation (6) can be used to
derive the phonon modes of the ions by making several further approximations (localized ions, harmonic expansion of
the energy around the equilibrium ion positions). The normal modes of the resulting harmonic model determine the
dispersion relations of phonons.
E: Finally, in order to model electron-phonon interactions explicitly, a quantum field theoretical formalism is required
that is based on creation and annihilation operators for electrons and phonons, see for instance [Solyom (2009)], Ch.
23. The dispersion relations of electrons and phonons obtained by the above-mentioned methods determine the electron
and phonon propagators, but the interaction term requires a separate evaluation of the cross section for the scattering of
electrons via the emission or absorption of a phonon.
Doping Effects Doping with impurities adds electrons to the conduction band (donor, or n-doping) or holes to the
valence band (receptor, or p-doping) ([Simon (2013)]:187-194).
p-n and n-p Junction effects The junctions between n-doped and p-doped regions are the key feature of transistors
([Mellisinos (1990)]:14-20; [Simon (2013)]:199-203). Electron diffusion at such junctions leads to depletion regions,
stabilised by induced electric fields ([Mellisinos (1990)]: Fig.1.9). Transistors are created by suitably shaped such
junctions ([Simon (2013)]:203-205).
Electric field effects We do not want to model the dynamics of a transition between ON/OFF states in the transistor,
but rather the steady state situation when it is in one or other of these states (conducting or not) according to whether
the applied voltage is above a threshold or not. This means that electric field effects must be modelled.
To do this, the gate voltage V (t) must be added to the model. This leads to a potential energy term in the Hamiltonian
of the electrons:
HV (t) =
∑
i
eV (ri, t) (7)
where the Level T4 variable V (t) determines the Level T1 variables V (ri, t) in a downward way. It leads to a
displacement of the electrons until a new equilibrium is reached where the electrical field created by the modified
charge distribution cancels the electrical field due to the gate voltage. In order to calculate this new equilibrium, a
self-consistent calculation based on the charge density due to doping, gate potential, and thermal excitation must be
performed.
This alters the band structure ([Mellisinos (1990)]:19, [Simon (2013)]: Fig.18.6) and thereby either creates a conduction
channel by changing the depletion zone, or not, according to the bias voltage applied (compare Figs. 2 and 3 above). In
the case of the ON state, an additional electric field between the two contacts leads to electron conduction, which will
be discussed in more detail further below.
4.2 The disconnect
The previous description has shown that even though one starts with the electron-ion Hamiltonian, one makes
subsequently a series of approximations that effectively replace the initial model by other models. These other models
involve classical elements and elements from statistical physics, in addition to Hamiltonians. It is this combination of
elements that enables the switching between the ON and OFF state of the transistor.
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(1) Level T1: The Born-Oppenheimer approximation is based on the idea that ions are localized objects, neglecting
entanglement between ions and electrons. This is an element from classical physics, and it is essential for obtaining the
lattice structure, which breaks the symmetry of the underlying Hamiltonian [Primas (1998), Chibbaro et al (2014].
A purely quantum-mechanical calculation cannot give such a symmetry-broken ground state. However, this
symmetry-broken state is the basis for deriving electronic band structure and phonons (cf [Anderson (1972)],
([Phillips (2012)]:1-2). This means that the new Hamiltonians that describe electrons in bands and quasiparticles called
phonons are based on a new, phenomenological theory that includes essential classical ingredients.
(2) Level T2: Electron conduction on the most microscopic level is typically described using the Boltzmann
equation ([Phillips (2012)]:179-187), which includes collision rates as basic ingredient. This means that a model
with localized electrons and stochastic transitions is used, neither of which feature in the initial Hamiltonian.
This description is therefore not derived from a microscopic Hamiltonian, but it is the appropriate form of physi-
cal dynamics that applies at that level: it has its own logic that is not fully determined by the underlying quantum physics.
(3) Level T3: The derivation of the phonon dispersion relations involves the quantization of classical harmonic
oscillations, which in turn are obtained by approximating the ion equation from the Born-Oppenheimer approximation
by an harmonic expansion around the ion equilibrium positions. This means that one is using a classical intermediate
model, the low-lying excitations of which are quantized by hand. This leads to a new Hamiltonian, which again is not
really derived from the supposedly fundamental Hamiltonian for the electrons and ions.
(4) Level T4: In order to calculate the charge in the depletion region, one performs a classical electrostatics calculation
based on the electron density in the conduction band obtained from statistical physics calculations of the thermally
excited electrons. Again, this is not derived directly from the base Hamiltonian, because contextual information about
the structure of the transistor, the doping, the gate voltage, and the temperature need to be taken into account.
Overall there is no continuous derivation of the relevant properties from the Hamiltonian 2. There are rather a series
of empirically adequate phenomenological models building on each other but not derivable from them. As stated by
Leggett [Leggett (1992)],
“No significant advance in the theory of matter in bulk has ever come about through derivation
from microscopic principles. (...) I would confidently argue further that it is in principle and
forever impossible to carry out such a derivation. (...) The so-called derivations of the results
of solid state physics from microscopic principles alone are almost all bogus, if ‘derivation’ is
meant to have anything like its usual sense. Consider as elementary a principle as Ohm’s law.
As far as I know, no-one has ever come even remotely within reach of deriving Ohm’s law from
microscopic principles without a whole host of auxiliary assumptions (‘physical approxima-
tions’), which one almost certainly would not have thought of making unless one knew in advance
the result one wanted to get, (and some of which may be regarded as essentially begging the question).”
“This situation is fairly typical: once you have reason to believe that a certain kind of model or
theory will actually work at the macroscopic or intermediate level, then it is sometimes possible to
show that you can ‘derive’ it from microscopic theory, in the sense that you may be able to find the
auxiliary assumptions or approximations you have to make to lead to the result you want. But you
can practically never justify these auxiliary assumptions, and the whole process is highly dangerous
anyway: very often you find that what you thought you had ‘proved’ comes unstuck experimentally
(for instance, you ‘prove’ Ohm’s law quite generally only to discover that superconductors don’t obey
it) and when you go back to your proof you discover as often as not that you had implicitly slipped in
an assumption that begs the whole question. ”
“Incidentally, as psychological fact, it does occasionally happen that one is led to a new model by
a microscopic calculation. But in that case one certainly doesn’t believe the model because of the
calculation: on the contrary, in my experience at least one disbelieves or distrusts the calculation
unless and until one has a flash of insight and sees the result in terms of a model. I claim then that
the important advances in macroscopic physics come essentially in the construction of models at an
intermediate or macroscopic level, and that these are logically (and psychologically) independent of
microscopic physics.”
Such approximations and models are introduced at each step up in the representation of the implementation hierarchy.
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4.3 Branching causation: The downwards links
The depletion region grows or shrinks depending on the applied voltage. This cannot be described in a Hamiltonian
way, because it is based in diffusion processes. Furthermore the current flow is determined by collisions with impurities
and phonons, as characterised by a scattering time τ (a micro variable) associated with the resistance of the material (a
macro variable) ([Simon (2013)]:19). In both cases one has irreversible dynamics arising from the underlying unitary
dynamics in the context of the transistor structure, and the issue of the arrow of time occurs. Ultimately this is resolved
by Contextual Wavefunction Collapse, where heat baths in contact with the external environment determine the local
arrow of time from the cosmological direction of time ([Drossel and Ellis (2018)]).
This opening or closing of the conduction channel happens in accord with the instructions at the binary logic
level, via the basic computer functioning cycle (fetch half cycle, execute half cycle) ([Mellisinos (1990)]:75-76;
[Tanenbaum (2006)]:54-58) executed via modules such as depicted in Figure 1. This happens according to the logic of
the algorithm being implemented (see Table 1).
The bottom line The entire design of the transistor is chosen such that it can act as an ON/OFF switch triggered by the
gate voltage:
The crucial dynamic When a time dependent bias voltage V (t) is applied to a transistor gate, it
alters the underlying Hamiltonian through the time-dependent potential term HV (t), see (7), so
usual existence and uniqueness theorems do not apply: outcomes are not determined by initial
data. Furthermore the dynamic at work is anyway not just about changing a Hamiltonian, but also
about the macroscopic world, which has classical features that arise from ongoing localization and
symmetry breaking due to interaction with heat baths, which affect what happens at the transistor
level. This changes outcomes in a way determined by the potential V (t), as expressed in (1). This is
how the logic represented in the abstract structure of the computer program, expressed in machine
code, controls the underlying physics at the electron level; the electron dynamics is no longer unitary.
Outcomes are determined by the time dependent function V (t) determined by the machine code (Level M1 in Table
1), and applied in the context of the specific detailed structure of the transistor concerned (Wikipedia, Transistor; cf.
Figs. 2,3). We represent that structure in a phenomenological way rather than by detailed constraint equations in the
Hamiltonian formulation.
5 The nature of variables
Strong emergence enabled by downward causation is clearly taking place when the relevant higher level variables
cannot be obtained by coarse graining lower level variables (they are not ‘nothing but’ a summation of lower level
effects) (§5.1); or when the lower level variables are created due to the nature of higher level structures (‘downward
emergence’) (§5.2).
5.1 Irreducible Higher Level Variables
In terms of existence of intrinsically higher level variables, the key distinction is between global versus local variables,
Physical: The transistor structure as a whole (cf Figures 2 and3) is a Level T4 feature, determining how lower level
entities interact with each other. Lattice vibrations ([Phillips (2012)]:171-172) are a property of the crystal as a whole,
which cannot be described or understood at any lower level. Thus phonons are a collective property arising from the
macroscopic crystal structure ([Phillips (2012)]:169-172). The depletion zone is a property of the specific transistor
construction, so is again a higher level variable.
Logical: A computer program as a whole [Abelson and Sussman (1990)] is an irreducible higher level entity. The scope
of a variable is a key feature of a program; global variables are higher level quantities. Passing global parameters or
variables to subroutines in a computer program changes logical constraints at the lower level.
The logical-physical interface Logical variables - which are defined in digital computers at each level of the virtual
machine hierarchy (Table 1) - cannot be derived from physical variables because they are simply of a completely
different nature. Rather they can be represented by physical variables - which cannot possibly be a bottom-up process,
because the very concept of logical variables is not a physics concept.
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5.2 Creating lower level variables
Logical: Declaration of variables in hierarchical computer programs includes a statement of scope: whether they are
global variables, or only valid in particular sub-routines, in which case they are hidden local variables according to the
principles of modular hierarchical structuring.
Physical: In condensed matter physics, many key lower level variables exist because of downward constraints due to
the nature of higher level structures such as crystals and junctions:
Phonons come into existence due to lattice vibrations and are a key example of downwards causation ([Sartenaer (2015)],
[Guay and Sartenear (2018)] discuss the nature of this downward creation of lower level elements.)
Band structures [Simon (2013)] result from the details of the crystal structure and are modified by tiny levels of
impurities - the impurity density is a very carefully controlled global variable.
Depletion regions due to a balance between diffusion and electric field forces (Wikipedia: Depletion region) result from
the detailed nature of the junction between p-doped and n-doped regions. Its geometrical design (a higher level variable
relative to the electron level) is key.
6 Synchronic and Diachronic Supervenience
It is claimed that downward causation is not possible because of supervenience, see [Gibb et al (2019)] for an extensive
discussion. Synchronic supervenience is the idea that any specific lower level state L1(t0) at time t0 leads to a unique
higher level state HI(t0) at that time. Diachronic supervenience is the idea that any specific lower level state L1(t0) at
time t0 leads to a unique higher level state HI(t1) at a later time t1. Its justification is the combination of synchronic
supervenience with the alleged unitary dynamics at the lower level: i.e the assumption that the initial lower level state
L1(t0) uniquely determines the later lower level state L1(t1).
However we have seen above that the latter assumption is not generically true: lower level branching dynamics can occur
due to higher level variables changing constraints at the lower levels (a simple example is a pendulum of varying length,
see the Appendix of [Ellis and Koppel (2019)] for details). Here are some examples of the possibilities (§6.1-§6.4).
6.1 Fixed Programs and data
If the program P has fixed initial data D that is loaded with the program, so that at time t1 both P and D are in memory,
then diachronic supervenience will hold from that time on: the computer will run according to that program and data,
and the outcome is uniquely determined at each time t > t1 (provided the program halts: we will not deal with that
issue here). But how did the program and data get there? They were not there at an earlier time t0. The initial state
S(t0) when the program and data have not been loaded cannot predict the later state S(t1) they are in memory. Thus
diachronic supervenience will not be true from time t0 to time t1.
6.2 Interactive programs
Suppose data is input on an ongoing basis by sensors, for example in the case of aircraft automatic landing systems.
The data D(t) used such as height, wind speed and direction, direction to the airport, position of other aircraft, and so
on is updated on the basis of radar, GPS, and other readings. These are not predictable from the microphysics: they
are high level variables. They are not uniquely predictable from the earlier data. Thus diachronic emergence does not
hold. The training of artificial neural nets (ANNs) is another example. Weights of links between nodes are determined
by backpropagation algorithms and supervised deep learning methods, which depend on the order in which training
examples are used and the specific data set chosen. These are not predictable on the basis of the data initially available
to the computer.
6.3 Adaptive programs
Programs that learn, for instance evolutionary computation based in genetic algorithms ([Mitchell (1996)]) go a step
further: the program P(t) is a functions of time, and is optimised as execution proceeds. In such programs, a random
number is chosen to seed the selection process, which can be based for example on the precise time when program
execution started, and hence is unpredictable from both a microphysics and macroscopic viewpoint.
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6.4 Unpredictable input
One can chose to run programs where program branch points are determined by quantum uncertainty. Thus one can
have data specified by a sensor detecting particles emitted by decay of a radioactive atom, in which case the detection
times and consequent program branchings are unpredictable even in principle because of the foundational nature of
quantum uncertainty ([Ghirardi (2007)]). Diachronic supervenience is impossible in this case because the data D(t)
cannot be known in advance of the quantum detection event.
6.5 Evolutionary development
Finally how did digital computers on the one hand, and transistors/integrated circuits on the other, come into existence?
They did not exist 100 years ago, now they do - an example of diachronic emergence where the outcomes were not
entailed by the initial data, so it is not an example of diachronic supervenience. They came into being via a creative
evolutionary process of creative vision of possibilities leading to adaptive selection of technology and associated
concepts, for example the idea of the transistor, its detailed development into a variety of implementations, and the
development of the complex manufacturing methods for VLSI chips ([Mellisinos (1990)]:36-37).
6.6 The larger context
A computer is not a closed system. It is an open system and therefore a Hamiltonian description fails anyway. It is open
in many respects: new bits from the computer program, needs electrical power, is in contact with heat baths, has finite
temperature and emits therefore photons, and so on. The basis for diachronic emergence is not there.
7 Conclusion
This paper clarifies how the logical structure of computer programs, implementing suitable algorithms, controls the flow
of electrons at the transistor/gate level in digital computers. To conclude, we discuss in turn in this section, how abstract
entities can have causal powers, and hence physics per se is not causally complete (§7.1); the difference between the
argument presented here and the case of biology (§7.2); the outcome that all levels are equally real (§7.3); and the social
connection (§7.4),
7.1 Abstract entities have causal powers
It thereby provides a clear example of downward causation from algorithms and data to the relevant underlying physical
level (electron flows in semiconductor materials); this is what enables the dual pair of computer programs and their associ-
ated data to have genuine causal power - as they undoubtedly do [McCormack (2011)] - through a computational process.
The nature of such a process is described by Abelson and Sussman as follows ([Abelson and Sussman (1990)]:p.1):
“Computational processes are abstract beings that inhabit computers. As they evolve, processes
manipulate other abstract things called data. The evolution of a process is directed by a pattern of
rules called a program. In effect, we conjure spirits of the computer with our spells. A computational
process is indeed much like a sorcerer’s idea of a spirit. It cannot be seen or touched. It is not
composed of matter at all. However it is very real. It can perform intellectual work. It can answer
questions. It can affect the world by disbursing money at a bank or by controlling a robot arm in a
factory”.
Thus they are examples showing that a simple materialist position - the idea that only physical entities can have causal
powers - cannot be correct:
Abstract entities have causal powers It is clear from this discussion that (1) algorithms, (2)
computer programs, and (3) data - all abstract entities - have causal powers because they alter
physical outcomes in a real world social context.
This furthermore shows that consideration of digital computers gives a concrete example of how the underlying physics
per se is not causally complete, as is often alleged. Rather,
Causal completeness: In the real world, it is only the combination of physics with its logical, social,
psychological, and engineering contexts (which includes the values guiding policy) that can be
causally complete, because it is this whole that determines what computer programs will be written
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and what data utilised, hence what electron flows will take place in integrated circuits, as per the
discussion in this paper.
As a specific example: the amount of money that can be dispersed to you from an ATM will be limited by an agreement
you have reached with your bank. The program used to control the ATM will take into account the existence of such
limits, and the specific amount you are able to take out in a given time period will be limited by a logical AND operation
linking this agreed amount to the amount of money in your account. Thus these abstract variables will control electron
flows in both the bank computers and the ATM dispenser mechanism.
7.2 The difference from biology
In the case of biology, much of the arguments about the effectiveness of top down causation, able to guide dynamic
outcomes at the underlying electronic level, is the same as presented here [Ellis and Koppel (2019)]. However there is
a key difference.
In that case, signalling molecules ([Berridge (2014)]) cause a change in distances between nuclei in other biomolecules
and thereby alter the Hamiltonian governing the physics in a time dependent way. Here, the distances between nuclei
are fixed to a high approximation: they are subject to temperature dependent fluctuations, but their average positions
are essentially unaltered by the electronic signals conveyed to the transistors. It is the electron band structure that is
changed via a change in electric potential difference between the base and the conductor, which alters the Fermi surface
and depletion zone and hence alters the flow of carriers (electrons and holes).
In both cases it is the exquisitely shaped physical context that enables it to happen: here, the precise design and
manufacture of the transistors; in that case, the precise shape of the biomolecules that implement logical choices as
explained in [Ellis and Koppel (2019)]. In that case it is a result of natural selection and developmental processes; in
this case, a result of intelligent design [Simon H A (1996)] and precision manufacture: a developmental process occurs
whereby physicists and engineers try out all sorts of options to see what works best, leading to very precise doping of
semiconductors, precise lithography to create integrated circuits, and so on ([Mellisinos (1990)]:25-29,35-37). The
computers and transistors would not exist without this evolutionary process, which results in the existence of physical
products such as digital computers, whose existence cannot be accounted for by physics alone [Ellis (2005)].
7.3 The outcome: all levels are equally real
In the case of biology, all emergent levels are equally real: because of downward causation, they are all causally
effective in terms of their own logic, as emphasized by Noble [Noble (2011)].
In the case of digital computers, each physical level in the implementation hierarchy (Table 2) has real causal powers as
expressed in terms of the variables relevant at that level. Causality at the different physical levels is coordinated via a
combination of upwards emergence and downwards constraint ([Ellis (2016)]). Furthermore, each virtual machine in
the logical hierarchy ([Tanenbaum (2006)] and Table 1) is as real as each other; they are all equally causally effective.
It is for convenience that we write programs in terms of higher level variables, which are more attuned to the way the
human mind thinks. We could in principle write them at any level!
This equal effectiveness of all higher levels is the explicit result of a largely uncelebrated aspect of computers: the devel-
opment of compilers and interpreters that translate logic representations downwards between levels [Aho et al (2006)],
without which computers would be largely unusable.2 This is the explicit machinery that acts downward to enable
abstract high level programs to control flows of electrons in transistors in such a way as to represent abstract logic. In
physics terms, the logic of the relevant algorithm is represented by the time dependent pattern of change of the potential
energy term (7) in the electron Hamiltonian, in accord with the digital representation of the algorithm in machine code.
7.4 The social connection
The high level programs and data are thus represented in machine code, which is realised in physical terms as a time
sequence of current flows at the electron level that implements the algorithm logic. But it is individual or social needs
2Try writing a complex program in Assembly language ([Tanenbaum (2006)]:507-521), or much worse, Machine code! The
name of Grace Hopper should be up there with the panoply of computer greats such as Charles Babbage, Ada Lovelace, Alan Turing,
and John von Neumann: see Wikipedia, ‘Grace Hopper’.
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or purposes that control what programs are actually written and change the world, such as Google, Facebook, Paypal,
Uber, AirBnB, and so on ([Thompson (2019)]). Ethical issues necessarily arise, for example as regards how social
media such as Facebook use algorithms based in social engineering to increase impact factors ([Bissell (2019]), so
ethical values are important causal factors in program design. The underlying values and understandings of meaning
that guide social interactions are in fact the highest level causal factors in computer usage: they are key determinants in
deciding what needs will be met in what way by what algorithms. However electron flows make it happen.
The results of this paper have possible implications for arguments regarding emergence and reductionism in the case of
the mind/brain ([Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008)], [Humphreys (2016)]), and specifically those arguments against free
will based in the alleged causal completeness of physics at the bottom level, related in a key way to the possibility of
responsible action. We will not pursue those issues here; we simply comment that the results of §7.1, combined with
those of [Ellis and Koppel (2019)], are potentially relevant to the argument.
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